Backes & Backes (609) 730-3838

Probate Litigation

The Will Controls: Settling a Will Contest Does Not Change the Inheritance Tax

Most Will contests end in a settlement, and most settlements move money away from the people the Will favored and toward the person who challenged it. When the challenger is a child or grandchild and the money comes out of a share left to a friend, it seems natural to report the New Jersey inheritance tax the way the money actually moved, with the child’s share exempt. That is a mistake even careful practitioners make. New Jersey taxes the transfer the Will made, and the deal the family struck afterward does not change it.

One of the oldest statements of the rule, In re O’Neill’s Estate, 111 N.J. Eq. 378 (Prerog. Ct. 1932), held that an agreement among beneficiaries after probate “operates, and can operate, only by way of transfer subsequent to the transfer made by the will,” so the tax is assessed on the Will’s transfers alone. Borish v. Zink, 2 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 1949), applied the same rule to a court-approved compromise of a Will contest that divided the estate “in entire disregard of the will,” because the Will remained “an essential link in the chain of title.” In Donovan v. Baldwin, 10 N.J. Tax 224 (1988), the Tax Court held that incorporating the settlement in a consent order made no difference. The Appellate Division made clear in Sullivan v. Margetts, 9 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1950), that the rule cuts both ways: a compromise “does not increase the tax burden,” and “it should not be permitted to diminish the burden.”

In De Rosa v. Director, Division of Taxation, 28 N.J. Tax 73 (2014), Joseph Rendeiro’s Will left $10,000 to his granddaughter, $25,000 to his sister, and the rest of his estate to his son-in-law, who was also his executor. The granddaughter challenged the Will for undue influence and lack of capacity, and at mediation the parties agreed that she would take $400,000. The executor reported her as a Class A beneficiary of $400,000. The Division taxed her $10,000 bequest as Class A and the other $390,000 as what the Will had made it, part of the son-in-law’s residuary share, at Class C rates, and the Tax Court agreed. In the eyes of the statute, the money that reached the grandchild went first to the son-in-law, who then gave it to her.

The De Rosa estate returned to the Tax Court again, in De Rosa v. Director, Division of Taxation, 28 N.J. Tax 256 (2015). This second case is significant and cautionary. There the Tax Court upheld a penalty that would have been avoided if the executor had calculated the tax according to the Will and not according to the settlement. The executor argued that he had reasonable cause, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle (discussed below), and the court held that his reliance was “misguided and unreasonable” and that the rule was “long-settled.” The Appellate Division affirmed in a published opinion, De Rosa v. State, Department of the Treasury, Division of Taxation, 29 N.J. Tax 482 (App. Div. 2016), and said what the estate should have done: it “could have protected the estate [. . .] by paying the tax as though there had been no settlement, under protest, and then obtaining a refund, if successful.”

The exceptions are narrow, and none of them is the settlement itself. In Matter of Estate of Lingle, 72 N.J. 87 (1976), the decedent had promised in a separation agreement to leave half his estate to the daughters of his first marriage and then left everything to his second wife. The Supreme Court held that a valid contract to make a testamentary disposition can itself be the taxable transfer, and that when the daughters’ claim was settled rather than performed, “tax consequences in such cases should follow the result.” That is a claim on a promise the decedent made during his life, closer to a creditor’s claim than to a contest, and De Rosa held that a challenge to the Will’s validity is not one. Sullivan v. Margetts allows a fair settlement of that kind of claim to be deducted as a debt of the decedent, if the Director is satisfied that the settlement was fair. And in Pope v. Kingsley, 40 N.J. 168 (1963), the contest ended in a consent judgment that withdrew the contested Will and admitted an earlier one to probate. The tax followed the earlier Will, because the Director had not claimed fraud and could not attack the probate judgment collaterally. The first De Rosa opinion also suggested, without deciding, that a settlement might be respected where an executor who is not a beneficiary settles a contest to carry out the Will. No binding decision has taken up that suggestion.

For a litigator, the rule changes the arithmetic of settlement, because a settlement that moves money from a Class C or Class D share to a Class A challenger saves no tax at all, and the tax is still owed on everything the Will left to the beneficiary who gives up money, including the part that goes to the challenger. Run the other way, a Class A beneficiary who settles with a Class D challenger out of an exempt share creates no new tax. Where a challenge is strong enough to set the Will aside, Pope shows that resolving it by a judgment denying probate or admitting an earlier Will is a different thing, for tax purposes, from a payment under a Will that stands, and the choice between them deserves consideration before the agreement is signed.

Whatever the agreement says, the return should follow the probated Will. An estate that wants to argue for the settlement can pay on the Will, protest, and seek a refund. Filing on the settlement and hoping for the best is the course De Rosa punished.

The Office
12 West Delaware Avenue
Pennington, New Jersey 08534
(609) 730-3838